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Man's use of the oceans is not new. Nor for that matter are the
laws regulating use of the oceans.' From the 17th century until
the 1940's the laws governing man's use of the oceans were con-
sidered exemplary of legal stability and certainty.2  Such legal
stability and certainty were due in large measure to the relative
simplicity of ocean use. In addition to limited uses,3 there were
limited users.4  Advances in scientific knowledge and technologi-
cal ability, however, led to an increase in uses as well as an in-
creased number of users. As the types and frequency of ocean
space use have increased, existing legal guidelines have become
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1. The laws of the Roman Empire treated the issue of use of the seas.
The concept of free use of the sea was probably first codified in the sixth
century in the Code of Justinian. Fenn, Justinian and the Freedom of
the Sea, 19 Am. J. INT'L L. 716, 716-720 (1925).
2. In 1609 Hugo Grotius expounded the concept of freedom of the seas
to combat the idea of sovereign control over the seas. This idea won a
general acceptance which continued for over 300 years. Craven, The Chal-
lenge of Ocean Technology to the Law of the Sea, 22 JAG J. 31, 32 (1967).
3. Traditionally the world's oceans have been used for surface naviga-
tion (which includes commercial and military uses) and fishing.
4. Nations with ocean going vessels were relatively few and their fleets
were generally small.
patently and demonstrably inadequate. The area where existing
law is seen to be most inadequate is the area of seabed resource
development.
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This article will attempt to briefly examine the inadequacies of
the law relating to seabed resource exploitation and outline the
reasons for this inadequacy. It will also examine current efforts
to overcome present inadequacies. Throughout this discussion the
importance of accommodating various uses will be stressed. It is
recognized that such an accommodation involves an examination of
ocean uses other than seabed resource exploitation. Nonetheless the
primary focus of this article will be on the peculiar problems of
seabed resource exploitation, although the necessity of achieving an
overall accommodation with other uses is conceded.
SEABED REsoURcEs EXPLOITATION IN THE PAST
Before the third and fourth decades of the 20th century there was
no real concern about seabed resource exploitation., However,
as large scale petroleum production became possible pressure for
legal justification of and protection for offshore oil production
mounted. This pressure ultimately resulted in the so-called doc-
trine of the continental shelf.
The doctrine of the continental shelf started with the issuance by
President Harry S. Truman of a Presidential Proclamation on the
28th of September 1945.6 In simple terms, the continental shelf
doctrine is a statement that the coastal state has sovereign rights
4a. Other areas of concern include the problems of land-locked countries,
the breadth of the territorial sea, the question of international straits,
fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high seas, and the
preservation of the marine environment.
5. Prior to 1945 small portions of continental shelves off the coasts of
Ceylon and Bahrein had been exploited as sedentary fisheries grounds.
In addition, the 1800's witnessed attempts to extend land-based mines into
the subsoil of continental shelves in England, Australia, Chile, Japan and
Canada. These uses of the continental shelf did not extend past the state's
territorial seas or if they did, they were grounded in a special historical
recognition and thus furnished no basis for a "shelf" policy. In 1942 the
United Kingdom and Venezuela signed a treaty dividing the Gulf of Paria, a
narrow expanse of sea between Venezuela and Trinidad, with the obvious
intent of allowing for petroleum production. 1 U.N. Legislative Series
44-47, Gr. Brit. Treaty Ser. No. 10 (1942). For several reasons, including
the fact that it was only a bilateral treaty obligating each party not to
assert a "claim to sovereignty" over certain areas next to the coast of the
other, this treaty was an instrument of passing interest at best. See
Vallat, The Continental Shelf, 23 BPRr. Y.B. INT'L L. 336 (1946).
6. Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, September 28, 1945, 59 Stat. 884,
10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945). It should be noted that President Truman also
issued a fishery proclamation on the same day.
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for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of the seabed min-
eral resources of the shelf area. The Truman Proclamation itself
found quick international acceptance. Many other states issued
similar statements.7 Further, there was multilateral consideration
of the doctrine under the auspices of the International Law Commis-
sion starting in 1949.8
From 1945 until 1958 there was an accelerated acceptance of the
doctrine that littoral states have a legal right to develop and utilize
seabed resources off their coasts. In 1958 an international confer-
ence promulgated the Convention on the Continental Shelf.9 This
multilateral treaty is a codification of the customary international
legal rule of the doctrine of the continental shelf which had de-
veloped in the period from 1945 to 1958.10 Named for the geo-
graphical formation on which it was anticipated that exploitation
would occur, the doctrine of the continental shelf set forth in the
Shelf Convention provides that a coastal state has sovereign rights
for the purpose of exploring and exploiting seabed resources, which
include mineral resources and living organisms of the sedentary
species, to a depth of 200 meters, or beyond that to the point where
the depth of the superjacent water allows exploitation.'1 In ad-
7. For a list of claims and some discussion thereof see Young, The
Legal Status of Submarine Areas Beneath the High Seas, 45 Am. J. INT'L
L. 225 (1951).
8. The International Law Commission placed the subject of the con-
tinental shelf on its agenda when it began its work with respect to codifi-
cation of the law of the sea in 1949. 1 Y.B. INT'L L. ConMN 43, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SR5 (1949).
9. Convention on the Continental Shelf, adopted April 29, 1958, [herein-
after cited as Shelf Convention] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. 5578. This
Convention was entered into force on the 10th of June 1964. For
general information on the convention, its legal implications and develop-
ment in the area in the years preceding its adoption see F. Amador, THE
EXPLOITATION AND CONSERVATION OF THE REsOURCES OF THE SEA (1959); I.
Anninos, THE CONTINENTAL SHELF AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw (1953); S.
Oda, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SEA REsOURCES (1963); and M. Mouton, THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF (1952).
10. Although only approximately one-third of the nations of the world
have ratified the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the writings of
scholars and jurists (North Sea Continental Shelf cases, [1969] I.C.J.) and
actions of states indicate that the terms of the convention are accepted as
binding customary international law. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PETROLEUM
COUNCIL, PETROLEUMv REsouRcEs UNDER THE OCEAN FLOOR, 147-56 (1969);
AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION COMMITTEE ON DEEP SEA MINERAL REsoRcEs,
INTERIm REPORT IX (19 July 1968).
11. Shelf Convention Articles 1 and 2 supra note 9.
dition the Shelf Convention provides for an accommodation of uses
by providing that exploration and exploitation should not unjustifi-
ably interfere with navigation, fishing, the laying of cables or sci-
entific research.
12
Such a multilateral convention, which recognizes generally ac-
cepted legal norms, which allows seabed resource development, and
which provides for an accommodation of uses and users, would be
expected to fulfill the needs of the world community. Unfortu-
nately this expectation has not been met in the case of the Shelf
Convention. The Shelf Convention's shortcomings are that it does
not really provide completely for a proper accommodation of other
interests, it does not establish a fixed seaward limit and it fails to
provide for all seabed exploitation. fnclusion of the last two points
in an assertion of shortcomings may seem strange in light of the pro-
vision that littoral state sovereignty over seabed resources extends to
200 meters or beyond that to the point where the superjacent waters
admit exploitation.13 One might argue that any concern about sea-
bed resource exploitation not provided for by the Shelf Convention
is definitionally unfounded,14 since if exploitation is not possible
there is no problem and if exploitation is possible then the coastal
state is given exclusive control thereof.'5 Such an interpretation
would allow a median line division turning the oceans of the world
into national lakes as far as seabed exploitation is concerned.' 0
However, the better interpretation of Article 1 of the Shelf Conven-
tion is that the term adjacency must be used to fix a seaward
limit to the juridical continental shelf."' This being the case, two
12. Id. Article 5.
13. It should be noted that the test is where the superjacent waters
admit exploitation and not exploration.
14. S. Oda, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SE REsouRcEs 167-68 (1963); Ei-
chelberger, The United Nations and the Bed of the Sea, 6 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 339, 345 (1969).
15. Under the terms of the Shelf Convention it would appear that suc-
cessful exploitation by one state would effectively extend the continental
shelf boundary of other states.
16. Strict adherence to an equal distance or median line division would
give islands control over areas of the ocean disproportionate with their
land territory. Charts showing the effect of such a division can be found
at the following places: Christy, A Social Scientist Writes on Economic
Criteria for Rules Governing Exploitation of Deep Sea Minerals, 2 INT'iL
LAwYER 224, 234 (1968); and Washington Post, Nov. 19, 1967, § B at 5.
For a discussion of the national lake concept see Bernfeld, Developing
the Resources of the Sea-Security of Investments, 2 INT'L LAWYER 67 (1967).
17. The exploitability test is modified and controlled by the term adja-
cency in Article 1, thus circumscribing global expansion. The intent of the
framers appears to support this view although their thoughts were pri-
marily that the deep ocean floor was simply beyond reach, and hence
their concern did not directly address this issue. 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n
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rather obvious questions arise: 1) what is the geographical or ter-
ritorial limit of the littoral state's exclusive right to seabed resource
development and 2) what procedures for management are appro-
priate for the area beyond littoral state control?
PRESENT PROBLEMS OF SEABED REsoURcE EXPLOITATION
Current developments and attitudes indicate a widespread ac-
ceptance of the idea that it is necessary to reach international agree-
ment on the unresolved issues relating to the law of the sea. As a
result of discussions during the 22nd Session of the United Nations
General Assembly the world became aware that there existed a
need to address the question of what was to be done with respect
to the seabed resources beyond the limits of national control.'8
Prompted by concern over the inadequacy of the existing seabed
resource regime, the world community also became concerned about
other unsolved or unsatisfactorily resolved problems of ocean space
use. 9
An historical examination of laws relating to the use of the
world's oceans demonstrates that the initial impetus came from
narrow national desires. At one point nations sought to control all
of the oceans or vast portions thereof.20  When it became impos-
sible to enforce such a system of unilateral control, a theory allow-
ing for free universal use arose.2 ' At this period of history,
fishing and surface navigation were the only substantial uses of
135-37, U.N. Doc. A/CN 4/SR5 (1956), remarks of Professor Scelle, Sir
Gerald Fitzmaurice, and Dr. Garcia-Amador. See also W. Burke, TowARDs
A BET=ER USE OF THE OCEAN 27-28 (1969) and Young, The Legal Regime of
Deep-Sea Floor, 62 Am. J. INT'L L. 641, 644 (1968).
18. Credit for initially raising the question of seabed resources in this
context goes to Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta who requested the inclu-
sion of an additional U.N. agenda item on this subject and then gave a
moving speech in support of his request in the First Committee U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/PV. 1515 and 1516 (1967).
19. These problems are described in two resolution passed during the
25th General Assembly of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV) 1970;
and G.A. Res. 2750 (XXV) 1970.
20. In 1493 Pope Alexander VI issued a bull establishing a papal de-
marcation line which purported to divide the world's oceans between
Spain and Portugal.
21. Hugo Grotius, the father of modern international law, established his
fame by advancing this theory for the Netherlands so that they could
participate in lucrative East India trade.
the ocean. Most fishing during this period was done by inhabitants
of littoral states in areas close to shore. Thus, there was little
or no conflict between nations over fishing. Surface navigation
involved the transfer of men and goods between distant points,
but even so there was little conflict. When viewed in this way
the agreement between states to provide for free use of the seas
is basically self-serving and selfish. Even the exception to free
use of the seas, the rule of a territorial sea, is clearly exemplary
of states' selfish concern for their territorial integrity.
22
When the general re-examination of the law of the sea began in
the late 1960's many scholars and politicans began to sense a new
level of difficulty with respect to uses of the sea. In the past ex-
pressions of self-interest could generally be accommodated in a way
satisfactory to all concerned. Because the scope of exclusive in-
terests was limited, there existed little international substantive
conflict. Of course the inclusive interests were considered to pre-
sent no real problems by virtue of their very nature. Viewed from
this vantage point, it seemed that only unwillingness to negotiate
stood in the way of the resolution of remaining or new problems.
Achievement of international agreements on many ocean use prob-
lems coupled with a lack of current concern caused a general
international lull.23 However this lull was short lived.
After a scant decade it became apparent that national claims were
increasing in terms of geographical scope.24 When this increase is
projected on a world-wide basis it becomes apparent that new prob-
lems of accommodation exist. In addition to this development, ex-
tensive utilization of existing ocean use rights by more and more
nations, and to a greater degree, demonstrated that when the num-
ber of uses and users increases significantly, difficult problems of
accommodation are created. For instance, since seabed resource
exploitation related to the seabed only, it was felt that it was a use
which would not conflict with navigation, be it innocent or free
22. It is a generalization to state that all rules relating to use of the
oceans were long established. Some specialized rules of limited effect and
longevity also existed. Most of these rules were embodied in domestic
statutes which came to be known collectively as "Hovering Acts." They
were aimed primarily at the prevention of smuggling. See Generally
M. Materson, JURISDICTION IN MARGINAL SEAS (1929).
23. Of course there had just been a great deal of activity in terms of
negotiating the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea and there
was continued activity in terms of ratification of these treaties.
24. For examples of the general rationale of such expanded claims see
the "Declaration of Santigo" 4 W. Whiteman, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1089-90 (1965); and the "Declaration of Montevideo" 9 INT'L LEGAL MATS.
1081 (1970).
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passage.25 In practice it soon became evident that a proliferation
of oil platforms in areas several miles distant from shore presented
a real hazard to and limitation on navigation.26 To a very real
degree seabed resource exploitation, long thought of as completely
compatible with surface navigation, shows itself to be incompatible
in part. Fishermen with their trawls occasionally sever submarine
cables. The discharge of effluents by merchant vessels causes so
much pollution that sport fishermen and bathers are precluded
from fully using the ocean. This representative list is exemplary
but not exhaustive, and its thrust is magnified as more uses and
users of ocean space appear. Thus the overcrowding or loading fac-
tor so common in other areas begins to apply to ocean space. The
very technology which turns man's attention to the oceans necessi-
tates a re-examination of accommodation questions.
Inherent in such a re-examination is a re-evaluation of one's self-
interest. Before, nations could stress uses most vital to their na-
tional interests with little or no internal conflict. Now, however,
various previously unrestrained uses must be considered in terms
of their effect on other uses. Compared to earlier national attitudes
of ocean use control, the result of such a re-examinaton may appear
almost altruistic.27 Instead it is only pragmatic.
To a greater or lesser degree new attempts at accommodation will
dominate the establishment of new international law controlling
ocean use. Ultimately negotiations between nations will be deter-
minative.27a A degree of schizophrenia may be exhibited by
25. Passage within territorial seas would have to be innocent for vessels
of states other than the coastal state but would be free on high seas areas
whether it was in an area over the continental shelf or beyond it.
26. For instance it has been necessary to establish fairways or sea lanes
in the area of the entrance into the mouth of the Mississippi River in the
Gulf of Mexico.
27. St. Thomas Aquinas is credited with having expressed the view that
there is no such thing as altruism. If one does something he does it be-
cause he would rather do it than anything else, even though the deciding
factor may relate to "indirect" satisfaction.
27a. This international interplay is itself an appropriate subject of study.
Based on the interests considered vital by the various nations, it is possible
to discern certain patterns. From these patterns one may project the type
of problem resolution which will ultimately occur. For a discussion of this
general subject see Gerstle, The Politics of U.N. Voting: A View of the
Seabed from the Glass Palace, Occasional Paper No. 7, Law of the Sea
Institute, University of Rhode Island (July, 1970); Friedheim, Factor Analy-
nations with diverse interests, and nations with limited interests
may be unusually strong in a relative sense. Assuredly negotia-
tions will be interconnecting and thus complicated.
SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO THE CURRENT PROBLEMS
or SEABED RESOURCE EXPLOITATION
Before nations advocate new international positions with regard
to seabed resource exploitation, the question of exploitation must
first be subjected to intensive national examination. Such exami-
nations have recently taken place in some states.2
8
Sparked by activities in the United Nations, 9 an intense na-
tional examination of seabed exploitation took place in the United
States. As is appropriate for a nation of diverse interests, this ex-
amination encompassed many different and even opposed views. 80
sis as a Tool in Studying the Law of the Sea. PROCEEDINGS, LAW OF THE
SEAS INsTITuTE 44-70 (L. Alexander ed. 1967); Friedhein, Kadane, and
Bamble, Quantitive Content Analysis of the United Nations Seabed Debate:
Methodology and a Continental Shelf Case Study. 24 INT'L ORGANIZATION
479-502 (1970).
28. Some of these examinations have been more complete than others.
In light of the complexity of such examinations, re-examinations are likely
from time to time.
29. See citations supra note 18.
30. For some idea of the nature of debate within Congress see: THE
OCEANS: A CHALLENGING NEW FRONTIER, REPORT AND HEARINGS ON H. RES.
179 BEFORE THE SUBCOMm. ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MovE-
mENTS OF THE HOUSE CovM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1968); HEARINGS ON S. RES. 33 BEFORE THE SuBcomm. ON OCEAN SPACE OF
THE SENATE Comm. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969);
INTERIMvr REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ISSUES OF DEEP OCEAN RE-
SOURCES AND HEARINGS ON H. RES. 179 BEFORE THE SUBCOMIm. ON INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONs AND MovEmENTs OF THE HOUSE COiMM1. ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); HEARINGS ON S.J. RES. 111, S. RES. 172,
AN S. RES. 186 BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); HERINGs BEFORE THE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON THE
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OF THE SENATE CoMvM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR
AFFAIRS, 91st Cong., Ist and 2d Sess., ser. 1, pt. 1 (1970). For a detailed
discussion of early Congressional debate and early consideration in the
United Nations see Weissberg, International Law Meets the Short-Term
National Interest: The Malta Proposal on the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor-
Its Fate in Two Cities, 18 INT'L AND Covtp. L.Q. 41 (1969). See also
ColvnvnssioN ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, OUR NATION
Aim THE SEA, A PLAN FOR NATIONAL ACTION (1969); and the NATIONAL
PETROLEUM COUNCIL, PETROLEUVI RESOURCES UNDER THE OCEAN FLOOR (1969).
For examples of this debate in purely private forums see Uses of the Sea,
(Gullion ed. 1968); PROCEEINGS OF THE LAW OF THE SEA INsTTUTE Uni-
versity of Rhode Island (Alexander ed. 1967, 1968, 1969, and 1970); Confer-
ence on Law, Organization and Security in the Use of the Ocean, Ohio
State University (1967, 1968); Wilkey, The Role of Private Industry in the
Deep Ocean, Symposium on Private Investments Abroad, 1969 Sw. L.
FOUND. 1.
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Assuming that there is a representative, if not exhaustive, diver-
sity of interest within the United States, and assuming that an ap-
propriate accommodation were made, the end result of the United
States' examination should be generally acceptable, in theory,
among other nations due to the "altruistic" function of an accom-
modation of diverse interests. Such is likewise true for France
and the United Kingdom. In addition to the United States,31
France3 2 and the United Kingdom 33 have undergone internal ex-
aminations of the seabed resource question and have submitted
working papers to the United Nations Seabeds Committee at its
August 1970 Geneva meeting.
The documents submitted by these three nations offer some indi-
cation of what the present problems are in the area of seabed re-
source exploitation as well as suggesting solutions to those prob-
lems. These formulations of problems and solutions are but-
tressed or rebuffed by the actions other nations have taken both in
the United Nations and in other international forums.34 It thus be-
hooves us to examine the "working papers" of the United States,34a
France and the United Kingdom with special emphasis on identify-
ing those areas where "altruism" has not led to the identification
and proposed solution of valid problems with respect to seabed
resource development.35
31. The United States position is contained in a May 23, 1970 statement
by President Nixon, White House press release issued on May 23, 1970, 62
DEP'T STATE BULL. 737 (1970); and the United States Draft of U.N. Conven-
tion on International Seabed Area, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1041-80 (1970)
[hereinafter United States Draft Convention], which was submitted at the
August 1970 meeting of the U.N. Seabeds Committee.
32. Proposals Concerning the Establishment of a Regime for the Explora-
tion and Exploitation of the Seabed, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/27 (1970), [here-
inafter cited as French Working Paper].
33. International Regime, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/26 (1970), [hereinafter
cited as United Kingdom Working Paper].
34. Most relevant statements made by other nations were made during
the course of the August 1970 Seabeds Committee Meeting in Geneva or
during the 25th General Assembly. Some relevant statements were also
made, however, as a part of the September meeting of the Non-Aligned
Conference in Lusaka, Zambia.
34a. The document submitted by the United States is not a working
paper, rather it is a draft convention.
35. For a general discussion of current U.S. oceans policy see Ratiner,
United States Oceans Policy: An Analysis, 2 J. MARITIME L. rm Co1vm. 225
(1971).
All three documents agree that there are problems and that they
should be solved by multilateral treaty. This general formulation
is buttressed by the action taken during the 25th General Assembly
of the United Nations. 6 The wording of several U.N. resolutions
suggests that the entire seabed has not been divided among lit-
toral states and should not be.3 7 But this view-that there exist
problems with respect to seabed resource exploitation-may be
subject, in terms of practical validity, to an acceptable inter-
national solution of those problems. It is generally agreed that
the ambiguity of Article 1 in defining the limits of the continental
shelf and the need for some basis for exploitation beyond that limit
must and should be solved. However, the failure of the world
community to solve these timely problems may lead to larger and
larger unilateral claims.38 A median line division of the bed of the
sea between coastal states would then in effect end the problems
earlier discussed without, in a sense, admitting their existence.3 9
Laying aside the unhappy, but real, possibility that there may
be no successful international legal solution to existing seabed re-
source exploitation problems, let us turn to the first issue de-
manding agreement. That issue is one of the extent or delimita-
tion; what are the geographical limits of a coastal state's sovereign
control over the exploitation of seabed resources.40
A. Limits of Littoral State Control Over the Exploitation of Sea-
bed Resources
In the French and British working papers the question of fixing
the geographical limit of the continental shelf is not directly ad-
dressed. The Draft Convention submitted by the United States
does address this question, however, and this gives some point of
departure. Under the U.S. Draft Convention all areas of the seabed
and subsoil of the high seas adjacent to a sovereign land mass and
landward of the 200 meter isobath would be areas where only the
littoral state would have rights of exploration and exploitation.
36. See citations supra note 19.
37. G.A. Res. 2749 and 2750 (XXV) 1970 and G.A. Res. 25741) (XXIV)
1969.
38. Failure to achieve meaningful progress by 1973 could well acceler-
ate such claims.
39. Any type of world-wide median line division is likely to create,
rather than solve, conflicts between states, at least as to the fixing of
boundaries.
40. Note that Article 2 of the Shelf Convention defines the coastal state's
rights as "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring ... and exploiting
... natural resources."
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All areas seaward of the 200 meter isobath are described as the "In-
ternational Seabed Area" and made the common heritage of all
mankind.4' That part of the International Seabed Area seaward
of the 200 meter isobath out to the base of the continental slope or
point where the deep ocean floor begins, is made an international
trusteeship of the coastal state. Within this area the coastal state
would have a great deal of discriminatory control but no title to
or sovereignty over seabed resources.
Despite the failure of the French and British working papers to
address the question of fixing the limit of the juridical continental
shelf, it is a central problem. It is important to critically examine,
then, the position set forth by the United States. First, the U.S.
position re-affirms total coastal state sovereignty over seabed re-
sources out to the 200 meter isobath. This position is one well fixed
under international law at the present time.42 Most nations of the
world are coastal states which consider themselves "owners" of sea-
bed resources out to the 200 meter isobath. Consequently, recogni-
tion of this legal fact by the U.S. Draft Convention appears in-
trinsically sound.48
According to the terms of the Shelf Convention, a coastal state
has sovereign rights not only out to the 200 meter isobath, but also
to the point where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of
exploitation, assuming the requirement of adjacency is met in both
cases. At the same time it is generally agreed that there is
a deep seabed which is not subject to national control. How
does one draw the line between these two points? Any solution to
this problem must take into account the practical aspects of geo-
graphical definition. A proposal which cannot be effected with-
out undue expenditure of time and money and without requisite
certainty constitutes a solution only in the theoretical sense.
41. United States Draft Convention, Article 1 supra note 31.
42. See citations supra note 10.
43. In spite of the fact that any boundary for a seabed area ought to be
related to seabed configuration, nations such as Chile, Ecuador and Peru,
which have very narrow continental shelves, may find it psychologically
necessary to demand a formulation which is phrased alternatively in depth
and miles from the coast, thus allowing a coastal state to avail itself of
whichever measure will afford it the greatest breadth of control. For an ex-
ample of this type of formulation see The United Nations and the Bed of the
Sea, NINETEENTH REPORT OF THE COlAnV£SSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF
PEAcE, at 24 (1969).
The solution proposed by the U.S. Draft Convention involves a
trusteeship zone for the continental slope. 44  Although it is ad-
mittedly difficult to define and fix geographically the line dividing
the continental slope from the deep seabed, any division related to
seabed exploration and exploitation should relate to the geological
configuration of the ocean's floor. Even before the present concern
over exploitation, students of the configuration of the land masses
underlying the oceans spoke in terms of the continental shelf, conti-
nental slope, and the deep ocean floor.
But even if it were admitted that there exist geologically distinct
seabed areas as outlined above, problems would still exist. First,
there exists the problem of fixing the lines of demarcation between
the areas in question. Second, there exists the problem of allocating
sovereign control over the seabed resources of these areas.
The first of these problems is limited somewhat by the arbitrary
but generally acceptable establishment of the juridical continental
shelf by fixing the seaward limit at the 200 meter isobath.4 , In
the case of the seaward limit of the continental slope a ready resolu-
tion is not so apparent. That portion of the U.S. Draft Convention
addressing this delimitation recognizes this difficulty and suggests
the use of a surface gradient ratio.46 Determination of the precise
gradient
"... should be determined by technical experts, taking into ac-
count, among other factors, ease of determination, the need to
avoid dual administration of single mineral deposits, and the
avoidance of including excessively large areas in the International
Trusteeship Area. '47
By allowing for straight lines of up to 60 nautical miles in length
to be defined permanently by coordinates of latitude and longitude,
the U.S. proposal enhances the possibility of practical execution. 48
Equally as important as the problem of fixing the lines of demar-
cation between seabed areas is the problem of allocating sovereign
control over the exploitation of seabed resources of these areas. As
44. Chapter III supra note 31.
45. Under Article 1(3) of the United States Draft Convention some hill
and valley jumping would be permitted in establishing the 200 meter
isobath.
46. United States Draft Convention, supra note 31, Article 26.
47. Id., Article 26, n.1.
48. Article 45 of the United States Draft Convention, supra note 31, pro-
vides for an International Seabed Boundary Review Commission. Coordi-
nation and assistance would be furnished to member states by this body.
The Commission's members would have suitable qualifications and experi-
ence in marine hydrography, bathymetry, geodesy and geology. If, in
spite of this assistance, no boundary is set, then the matter is referred to
the tribunal.
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has already been indicated, Article 1 of the Shelf Convention sets
out an ambiguous definition of the seaward limit of a littoral state's
sovereign control over seabed resources. Such control extends to
the 200 meter isobath and beyond, although the extent of the area
beyond 200 meters is unclear. According to the U.S. Draft, coastal
state resource sovereignty would remain inviolate to the 200 meter
isobath. Beyond that point jurisdiction over seabed resources
would rest in the world community, as represented by the Inter-
national Seabed Resource Authority, or ISRA.49 Thus some sov-
ereign rights over seabed resources seaward of the 200 meter
isobath would be vested in the world community under the U.S.
proposal. As envisaged under this proposal, however, this interna-
tional investiture is not without national recompense. In the trus-
teeship area the coastal state would retain most of the fees paid for
exploitation and would have the discriminatory right to
a. Establish the procedures for issuing licenses;
b. Decide whether a license shall be issued;
c. Decide to whom a license shall be issued...so
In essence ISRA, acting for the world community, would own the
resources, set certain minimum requirements, and share these des-
ignated ISRA controls, in the returns. Beyond the coastal state
would be allowed certain rights. In addition to alleviating the
problem of creeping national jurisdiction, 51 the trusteeship concept
champions an imaginative solution to the vexing problem of an
appropriate allocation of resource control. Since it would be only
a happy accident if a marked geographical break lay at exactly the
right spot, and such is not the case, none-the-less some line
must be drawn with relation to seabed geography. Embodying a
49. For a fuller idea of what ISRA involves see United States Draft
Convention, supra note 31, Chapter IV.
50. Id., Article 28.
51. One occurrence which was stimulated by the Truman Proclama-
tion and subsequent development of the continental shelf doctrine, and
which was reflective of the broad scope of changes so characteristic of the
mid-1900's, was the appearance of "creeping jurisdiction." Statement by
Department of State Legal Adviser John R. Stevenson, 63 DEP'T. STATE
BULL. 209, 210 (1970). This "creeping jurisdiction," or proclivity of states
to assert more extensive claims both in terms of area and degree of control,
was most evident in cases where states felt that their particular special in-
terests were not being met. Sometimes the nations unhappy with their lot
tied their actions to precedent (for example, President J.L. Bustamante
Rivero of Peru by a Presidential Decree dated 1 August 1949 proclaimed
more or less fixed or fixable geographic point, the trusteeship
zone offers room for allocation in terms other than area. A change
of the percentage of fees retained by the trustee state or a change
in its discriminatory power can easily give a readily measurable
benefit to either the international community or the coastal state.
Negotiation with respect to the type and extent of coastal state
control will tend to be carried on by those favoring greater inter-
national ownership, on the one hand, those who consider that
they have a vested sovereign interest in seabed resources beyond
200 meters on the other. Both material and theoretical interest
in this area are of some magnitude and it is thus encouraging to
see a flexible vehicle proposed as a means for resolving this dif-
ficult point.
To date one other rather interesting, if not unexpected, point of
concern has manifested itself with regard to the trusteeship pro-
posal. Because civil law nations have no exact legal counterpart to
our common law trusteeship, use of that term has caused some
consternation and apprehension in international circles. Even if
civil law countries never became fully conversant with our concept
of the fiduciary relationship, the accommodation afforded by a
"trusteeship" zone concept is sure to be appreciated.5 2
B. An International Body for Areas of International Control of
Resource Exploitation
Neither the French nor British working paper sets out in any de-
tail an international body for the area beyond national control, al-
though, along with the U.S., they recognize the importance of such
a body. An institution called the Board of Governors-vaguely
defined as a body elected by a plenary conference of those states
parties to a new seabed resource agreement and having the re-
sponsibility of administering such of the provisions of the agree-
ment as are within the competence of the international body-
sovereignty over the epicontinental waters covering Peru's shelf out a dis-
tance of 200 miles and in so doing cited declarations made by the President
of the United States, Mexico, Argentina and Chile) and sometimes they es-
chewed precedent on the grounds that they had no part in its creation.
Whether one's interests caused "creeping jurisdiction" to be viewed with
alarm or delight, the existence of "creeping jurisdiction" has an unsettling
influence on the law of the sea. It will be interesting, assuming the
trusteeship concept is accepted, to see if a type of creeping international
jurisdiction develops.
52. It must be noted that the term "trusteeship" does not represent the
use of a legal phrase under the common law. The term as used in the
United States Draft Convention means only what it is defined to mean
therein.
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is proposed by the United Kingdom.53 Based on the different
characteristics of hard mineral and hyrdro-carbon exploitation, the
French proposal outlines an international body to serve as a clearing
house for simple registration of non-exclusive licenses in the case of
hard mineral exploitation.54 In the case of hydro-carbon exploi-
tation there would exist a Conference of Plenipotentiaries (backed
by a Technical Committee) empowered to make decisions on con-
flicting claims and also to consider reported violations of appli-
cable regulations.5 The U.S. Draft Convention also recognizes the
difference between hard mineral exploitation, which will appar-
ently involve mobile suction or dredging equipment 56 and thus
not necessitate exclusive licensing, and hydro-carbon exploitation,
which will involve fixed equipment and thus necessitate exclusive
licensing.
57
In the U.S. Draft Convention, and also in general terms in the
working papers of the United Kingdom and France, there exists a
tendency to establish rather exactly the perimeters for development
of resources. Under these schemes the international institution is
primarily concerned with the registration of non-exclusive licenses
or granting of exclusive licenses pursuant to previously agreed
upon formulas. This general arrangement is the only realistic ap-
proach since all nations will want to be fully apprised of the effects
of an international regime before agreeing to accept it by ratifying a
multilateral convention. Past experience indicates, however, that
some body, with the power to apply these rules in specific cir-
cumstances and make certain adjustments from time to time, is
necessary to a viable regime. This need is most closely met by the
bodies outlined in the U.S. Draft Convention.
The operating agency under the U.S. proposal, ISRA, would be
made up of an assembly, a council, and a tribunal.58 The assembly
would be made up of all contracting parties with each state having
53. United Kingdom working paper, supra note 33, principle 6.
54. French working paper, supra note 32, Section I.
55. Id. at Section II.
56. See Covey, Ocean Mining System Completes Tests, UNDER = SEA
TECHNOLOGY, Oct. 22, 1970.
57. United States Draft Convention, supra note 31, Appendix A.
58. See generally chapter IV of the United States Draft Convention,
supra note 31. The tribunal would pass on the legality of measures taken
under the Convention in terms of the "constitutional" limitations pro-
one vote and, except as otherwise provided, would make decisions
by a majority vote of the members present and voting.0 Actions
taken by this council would be largely dependent on submissions
from the council.60 This council would be comprised of twenty-
four contracting parties in two categories: one including the six
most industrially advanced contracting parties" and the other in-
cluding eighteen elected states at least twelve of whom would be
developing countries. 62 Decisions by the council would require
approval by a majority of all members, including a majority in
each of the two major categories. 63
Given the necessary restrictions of a treaty establishing an in-
ternational seabed regime, it is still important to have a functional
international administrative body. Past and existing international
bodies demonstrate the problems inherent in establishing a proper
power distribution in such bodies. It appears that the drafters of
the U.S. proposal have drawn on the lessons of the past. In essence
the power distribution under ISRA is one which rejects a simple
one nation one vote rule as well as a rule involving a simple veto.
Employment of the one nation one vote rule inevitably leads, in
this time of the micro-state, to the "approval" of concepts unac-
ceptable in terms of the real-world distribution of power. In addi-
tion to being ineffective, such exercises do much to impede the
progress of international law. At the other extreme, allowing
one nation the power of a veto ultimately results in a body
incapable of taking meaningful action in any but the most extreme
circumstances. Whether or not the precise formulation set forth in
the U.S. proposal will ultimately be accepted is questionable, but its
general thrust appears beyond reproach.
C. Rules of Exploitation and the Distribution of Benefits
Even as rules for the various uses of ocean space are inexorably
linked, so the issues of the limits of littoral state seabed resource
exploitation control, the establishment of an international body for
areas of international control, and the basic rules of an international
seabed regime are intertwined. Inter-relations and dependencies
vided by the Convention,. pass judgment on disputes between parties re-
lating to interpretation and application of the Convention, and exercise
compulsory jurisdiction with respect to complaints of failure to fulfill obli-
gations under the Convention.
59. Id. at Article 34.
60. Id. at Article 35.
61. Id. at Article 36.
62. Id.
63. Id. at Article 38.
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of this sort make it difficult to assign importance to these areas ex-
cept in the most general terms. This multifaceted problem may be
most appropriately understood only in terms of groupings which
take into account a type of rationale akin to that underlying the
theory of permutations and combinations in mathematics. None-
theless a crucial part of any seabed resource grouping is repre-
sented by rules for exploitation and the distribution of benefits.
All three of the proposals submitted at the August meeting of the
Seabeds Committee in Geneva expressly indicated that some dif-
ferentiation could be made between hard mineral exploitation and
hydro-carbon exploitation. 64 To the extent the assessment that
hard mineral exploitation does not necessitate exclusive licensing
(and there is no reason to doubt it) there would appear to be no
problems with a simple registration procedure.
No simple registration will handle allocation of areas of exploita-
tion in the case of hydro-carbons, however. Exploitation of hydro-
carbons necessitates exclusive licensing and thus demands some
basis for resolving competing requests. Competitive bidding on a
cash basis is set forth in the U.S. proposal as the appropriate means
of allocating hydro-carbon exploitation.65 Agreement on a fixed
proportion of the seabed area which would be open for application
by the various states party is suggested by the United Kingdom.6 6
The United Kingdom further suggests that the congregate of state
allowances be for fixed portions of the total international seabed
area for successive fifteen year periods.6 7 By stating that the same
state should not be granted more than a certain total area of square
kilometers, France also indicates the advisability of some limitation
on the authorization of state exploitation.
6 8
Any licensing by the international community of an individual
state allowing exploitation by that state in a given area must be
subject to some control other than purely competitive bidding.69
64. See Section I of the French working paper, supra note 32; principle 8
of the United Kingdom working paper supra note 33; and Appendix A of
United States Draft Convention supra note 31.
65. United States Draft Convention, supra note 31 Appendix B.
66. United Kingdom working paper, supra note 33 Principle 8.
67. Id.
68. French working paper, supra note 32 Section III.
69. All three proposals involve the idea that dealings would be with
It is true that the world community derives collective benefit from
payment of licensing fees and royalties. To that extent the collec-
tive benefit is maximized by unrestrained competitive bidding. But
surely no one would be so naive or brash as to suggest that the re-
ceipt of royalties is the only matter of concern. Control over those
companies actually exploiting seabed resources involves matters of
law, politics and economics which collectively amount to a very sig-
nificant package for members of the family of nations. Concern
for internationalization of seabed resource exploitation must thus,
as correctly suggested by the United Kingdom and France, involve
some method of assuring that one state or one group of states does
not monopolize exploitation.
7 0
As important as a limit on bidding is some minimum assurance of
dissemination of technological competence. The fact that advanced
states would be limited does not in and of itself assure the less de-
veloped states that they can enjoy those rights reserved for them.
They must have the technological capacity and the means necessary
before they can participate. Most proposals designed to equalize
technological skill are highly complex and generally objectionable
either to the developed or developing states. That progress which
has been made in this area has generally occurred in connection
with the requirements of hydro-carbon concession agreements. Us-
ing this as a guide, attention might be focused on exploitation rules
which make it attractive for companies with appropriate technologi-
cal skill to seek the sponsorship of developing nations. For instance,
a checkerboarding of the international seabed area with certain
checkerboard areas being licensable only through developing states
might be considered. If a promising area were developed then there
would be an obvious advantage in obtaining a license for a connect-
ing area. If that area could only be licensed through a developing
country, oil companies would be encouraged to seek their sponsor-
ship. The fixing of a ratio between licenses to be issued developed
and developing nations might also be considered. Under such a
scheme, once a certain number of licenses had been issued through
developed states there would be no more licenses available to them
until a certain number of licenses had been issued through develop-
ing states.
At least two other reasons for controlling exploitation must be
considered. One is mentioned by the working papers,7 1 the other
states, that would in turn sponsor or authorize individuals or corporate
entities to actually conduct exploration and exploitation.
70. This discussion does not cover non-exclusive exploitation.
71. United Kingdom working paper, supra note 33 Principle 8; and
French working paper, supra note 32 Section III.
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in a resolution passed by the General Assembly.72 Control of ex-
ploitation so that it is extended over a period of time suggests the
need to ration irreplaceable resources and a need to maximize pro-
duction. Both concerns are similar and fall under the broad head-
ing of conservation. This area has not been addressed in detail to
date. Perhaps one of the reasons for this reluctance stems from the
fact that such conservation measures tend to have direct economic
impact on the world resource market.
The question of market control is the other subject which must
be considered. It will undoubtedly stimulate a heated discussion.
Both in the area of hydro-carbon production and in the area of hard
mineral production, seabed exploitation represents a disruptive fac-
tor for land-based resource development. 73 In the case of certain
hard minerals, seabed production could simply shut down land min-
ing.7-4 To a nation whose economy is substantially dependent on
such a mining industry the question involved here is one of econ-
nomic life or death. To all nations who produce the resources
existing on the seabed and to those nations who are purchasers of
these resources or who are producers and purchasers depending on
the resource, the issue of market control is also important. Some
internationally administered program for preventing a disruptive
change in price and production patterns must be devised. A price
and unit production control which would provide for a gradual
shift from land to seabed exploitation could accomplish this goal.
Individual resources could be treated differently and states depend-
ent on land based exploitation might simply be assured a vested
interest in transition, either absolute or relative, to seabed exploita-
tition. That is, a nation could be promised ownership of a certain
portion of resource seabed exploitation to replace its land based
resource exploitation. Obviously this is not a simple problem.
Hopefully the report of the Secretary-General on this matter 75 will
contribute significantly to a resolution of the market control
problem.
The remaining concern in terms of the substance of a seabed re-
72. G.A. Res. 2750A (XXV) 1970.
73. J. Mero, THE MmHRAL REsouRcEs oF =HE SEA, 50-80 (1965).
74. Mero, A Legal Regime for Deep Sea Mining, 7 SAN DiEo L. REv.
488, 489-90 (1970).
75. G.A. Res. 2750A, supra note 72.
source agreement is that relating to the distribution of benefits. In-
herent in any program involving international ownership of seabed
resources is the expectation of revenue from exploitation of the re-
sources.
France suggests in its working paper that the funds derived from
exploitation be contributed to the international community with an
appreciable share going to developing states.76 The state making
the royalty payment would be allowed to contribute that sum,
which would be fixed, as it saw fit.77 Both the United Kingdom
78
and the United States79 suggest a fixed payment to be adminis-
tered through an international body. A fixed portion for certain
regions of the world to be administered to individual states by desig-
nated regional organizations is suggested in the U.S. Draft Con-
vention.
Settlements or agreements involving money are never easy.
Agreement on the amount of money to go to developing nations
and a division among them will not come quickly. It is encouraging
to note that present formulations do involve special consideration
for developing states and allow non-discriminatory participation of
land-locked and shelf-locked nations. Utilization of regional or-
ganizations may well reduce this problem to manageable propor-
tions and foster the growth and strength of regionalism.
There exists another problem with respect to the future of inter-
national seabed resource development; a problem peculiar to tech-
nologically advanced nations. The problem is whether there will
be exploitation of resources beyond the 200 meter isobath between
the present and the time when a multilateral treaty comes into ef-
fect. If there is to be such exploitation, what form will it take?
This point was referred to by President Nixon in his May 23rd
statement.80 Such exploitation beyond 200 meters is, of course, not
clearly proscribed by existing international law.8 ' National ex-
ploitation of this area is being and will continue to be advo-
cated.8 2 Past experience with the Truman Proclamation has
76. French working paper, supra note 32 Section IV.
77. Such control by the exploiting state smacks too much of "colonialism"
to be internationally acceptable.
78. United Kingdom working paper, supra note 33 Principle 10.
79. United States Draft Convention, supra note 31 Appendix D.
80. United States Draft Convention, supra note 31.
81. See citations, supra note 17.
82. J. Laylin, Past, Present and Future Development of the Customary
International Law of the Sea and Deep Seabed, (Manuscript submitted to
INT'L. LAWYER). See United States Draft Convention, supra note 31 Article
73 for an indication of the nature of the interim policy set forth by the U.S.
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shown that any action by a nation such as the United States is mag-
nified many times over by similar acts on the part of other states.
Often criticial distinctions of fact, law or policy, so assiduously pro-
pounded by the first state to act, are ignored by other states in their
imitative actions. It is possible that declarations, statutes or actions
by the United States or other technologically advanced states which
spark extensive exploitation beyond 200 meters could give rise to a
mass proliferation of exploitation statutes and decrees by other na-
tions. Such a proliferation of national actions would amount to a
repudiation of the concept of resolving resource issues interna-
tionally as that concept is expressed in the U.N. "common heritage"
principle and President Nixon's Ocean Policy pronouncement. The
existence of real or imagined jurisdictional claims could make ulti-
mate agreement difficult if not impossible. The psychology of
"creeping jurisdiction" would be accelerated, resulting in a smaller
available area for internationalization. Certainly there would be
less incentive to seek multilateral agreement. The United States
and other technologically advanced nations may face a hard choice
between interim exploitation beyond 200 meters and a successful
international agreement. Hopefully the latter goal will be the one
pursued.8 8
Not all problems involved in the rules for exploitation and the
distribution of benefits have been discussed. Other problems such
as special consideration for enclosed or semi-enclosed bodies 4 de-
mand resolution as a part of any final agreement. Nonetheless the
issues discussed in this article lie at the heart of such an agreement.
Based on this discussion, what is the future of seabed resource ex-
ploitation?
Tim FuT RE or SEABED RESOURcE ExPLOITATiON
John R. Stevenson, the legal adviser to the Department of State,
speaking on the U.S. policy for law of the sea indicated that interna-
tional law serves several functions including:
First: Prevention of conflict...
Second: Security...
83. Because of inter-relation between seabed resource exploitation and
other law of the sea questions, failure to reach agreement in this area will
adversely affect chances for agreements in other areas.
84. Id., Article 26, n.1.
Third: Accommodation of interests... and...
Promotion of common or community objectives and providing
guideposts on matters heretofore dealt with on a strictly bilateral
basis .... 85
If only one could confidently and correctly predict that since
the functions served by international law are necessary to a
rational control of areas of international concern, and since the
oceans of the world are such an area of concern, international law
will be allowed to serve its functions with respect to seabed re-
source exploitation. Unfortunately such a prediction is no more
reliable than predictions about the weather. At least much has
been done-we have identified many problems, suggested some
solutions, and affirmed our intent and willingness to formulate a
new international legal regime.
This examination of the inadequacies of the law relating to sea-
bed resource exploitation and the reasons for this inadequacy has
revealed the story of a short childhood. Examination of current ef-
forts to overcome present inadequacies reveals a typically confused
adolescence. Both the United States and most members of the
world community are committed, on record, to the task of guarantee-
ing the achievement of maturity for the adolescent. Let us hope
that the guarantee is good.
85. Address before the Philadelphia World Affairs Council and Phila-
delphia Bar Association, Feb. 18, 1970, 9 INT'L. LEGAL MAZs. 434-35 (1970).
